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ABSTRACT 
A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted 
to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original 
motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life 
ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the 
decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we 
ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that differences in distribution are only 
a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals make. I intend to show that through the 
application of its own distributive procedures, the luck egalitarian approach actually undermines 
its original motivation by making the lives of individuals subject to brute luck.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Fusing Right and Left 
On what basis, if any, is it justifiable that some earn less than others? How one answers 
and asks this question, is the litmus test of whether one is a member of the political right or left.1 
Within the divided liberal tradition the right has answered this question of justice with an 
emphasis on individual freedom, while the left has stressed the importance of equality. A recent 
movement within political philosophy has attempted a synthesis between these two conceptions 
of justice, fusing the right’s regard for freedom and individual responsibility with the left’s 
concern for equality and fairness. 
The resulting synthesis called “luck egalitarianism” is concerned with mitigating the 
extent to which one’s well-being is subject to luck. I refer to any view as belonging to the luck 
egalitarian family of views if it “seeks to combine the traditionally radical idea of distributive 
equality with the traditionally conservative concern for holding people responsible for their 
actions.”2 The luck egalitarian position is chiefly motivated by the idea that one’s success in life 
ought to reflect one’s own choices and that we ought to mitigate the effects of bad luck on 
people’s lives.3 Ronald Dworkin summarized the ideal as follows: “We must allow the 
distribution of resources at any particular moment to be ambition-sensitive… but on the other 
hand, we must not allow the distribution of resources at any moment to be endowment-
sensitive.”4 The idea is that a person’s success in life ought to flow from their choices and should 
not entirely hinge on events outside of their control. I find this original motivation for luck 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, we can ask the same question but with a different default assumption: “On what basis, if any, is it 
justifiable to take resources from those who have produced them?”  
2 Knight 2009, 1. Also see Anderson 1999 
3 Jeremy Moss summarizes this succinctly, saying “Dworkin and Cohen tell us not only about the role of the 
chance/choice distinction but also about the goal of egalitarianism, which is to eliminate the effects of bad brute 
luck.” Moss 2014, 86 
4 Dworkin 1988, 311 
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egalitarianism to be intuitive and compelling. However, I worry that the general approach that 
luck egalitarian theorists propose to satisfy this ideal actually undermines this original 
motivation.  
In particular, I set about to demonstrate that implementing the luck egalitarian standard of 
justice indexes the economic well-being of a person to features entirely outside of their control. I 
demonstrate this by holding constant a person’s immediate circumstances and their choices in 
response to these circumstances, while altering features entirely external to their control. I focus 
on two external features in particular: the responsibility of others and the size of the population. I 
intend to show that according to luck egalitarianism, alterations in these external features 
completely change the earnings of an individual, despite the individual facing the same 
circumstances and making the same choices. That is, in a luck egalitarian system of justice, these 
external features overpower the importance of individual choice in determining economic 
outcomes.  If this is true, then luck egalitarianism undermines one of the central motivations for 
its adoption and so those originally accepting the position on these grounds now have good 
reason to abandon it.  
1.2 Outline and Methodology 
I begin by motivating the luck egalitarian position and then sketching a generic luck 
egalitarian standard of distributive justice. In sketching out this standard I also define key 
concepts and terminology. After defining this standard, I give a series of cases in which we can 
observe a set of individuals’ distribution under two conditions, a baseline condition and a luck 
egalitarian condition. The baseline condition models a distribution where income follows from a 
combination of an individual’s initial endowment and choice. The luck egalitarian condition is 
meant to correct for income flowing from unlucky initial endowments while preserving income 
3 
flowing from choice. Altering external features will reveal that while income flowing from 
unlucky initial endowments is indeed corrected, this correction has an overpowering effect such 
that income flowing from choices is not preserved. The upshot is that luck egalitarianism has one 
desirable consequence and two undesirable consequences. The desirable consequence is that 
satisfying the luck egalitarian standard significantly curtails bad luck stemming from unequal 
initial endowments. However, it achieves this at the expense of reducing the extent to which 
distributions are “choice sensitive” and further it indexes the economic success of a given 
individual’s life to features that are entirely external to their control.5   
I spend sections III through VI motivating, defining, and demonstrating the luck 
egalitarian approach to distributive justice. In sections VII and VIII, I offer two detailed 
demonstrations of how implementing luck egalitarianism undermines its original motivation. In 
sections IX through XIII I give five possible luck egalitarian objections and rebut each objection. 
I conclude in sections XIV and XV by exploring the underlying tension inherent in luck 
egalitarianism and offer some thoughts on how to resolve it.  
  
                                                 
5 See Dworkin 1988, 311 
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2 TWO CRITIQUES OF THE LUCK EGALITARIAN STANDARD 
2.1 Motivating the Luck Egalitarian Project 
Imagine that a day before you are set to proctor an exam a student e-mails you a doctor’s 
note that indicates she has come down with the flu and that she is too sick to attend class. You 
decide that this is a legitimate excuse for missing class and allow her to retake the exam at a later 
date. Two days after you proctor the exam, a separate student e-mails you asking to take the 
exam at a later date and offering no reason for missing the exam. You decide that the student has 
not been responsible and do not allow him to retake the exam. Given that both students are 
asking for the same thing why are you justified in treating these students differently? 
Presumably, your differential treatment is justified on the basis of their relative levels of 
responsibility. A common moral assumption is that we should not hold people accountable for 
things outside of their control, such as getting sick, while they are to be held accountable for 
things within their control, such as notifying others when they are unable to meet their prior 
commitments. It seems that differences in choice or responsibility can justify differential 
treatment and by consequence, differential effect. The irresponsible student is likely to have a 
worse grade than his more responsible counterpart as a result of not being allowed to retake the 
test, but we do not view this consequence as being unjust.  
Luck egalitarian accounts apply this same way of thinking to the topic of distributive 
justice. According to luck egalitarians, differences in income between any two individuals are 
justifiable if these differences are the consequence of their choices. By contrast, differences in 
income between any two individuals are not justified if these differences are the result of luck, 
that is, the result of events that they are not responsible for causing. 
5 
Luck egalitarianism draws its intuitive strength from combining two powerful ways of 
looking at normative issues. On the one hand it draws from liberal individualism, the idea that 
our lives should be a reflection of our own personal choices and decision making. On the other 
hand, it recognizes that sometimes people do poorly not because of any choice they have made 
but because they are the victims of bad luck. Thus, the approach incorporates an egalitarian 
element, whereby we can be justified in redistributing from those with good fortune to those with 
bad fortune in order to offset inequalities based on luck and not choice. 
2.2 The Luck Egalitarian Standard  
Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they 
share the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck so that 
differences in distribution are only a consequence of the responsible choices that individuals 
make.6 While the distributive goal offered here may not precisely map onto each approach, every 
luck egalitarian account should be sufficiently similar to make my critique relevant.7 
Generic Luck Egalitarian Standard: Economic goods are to be allocated such 
that all individuals equally share the burden of bad brute luck8, and that differences in 
economic goods are to only depend on differences in voluntary choices between 
individuals.9 
This description contains three terms that require further clarification: economic goods, 
bad brute luck, and voluntary choices. I discuss each of these terms in order.  
                                                 
6 I say “responsible choices” here because luck egalitarians disagree about what sorts of choices you should bear 
responsibility for and in what ways. See Arneson’s distinction between desert theorists and choice theorists. Arneson 
2004 
7 I discuss how Dworkin might relevantly diverge in the section entitled objection #5.  
8 Lippert-Rasmussen says “…when luck-egalitarians write about “neutralizing luck”, this is really short-hand for 
something like “eliminating the differential effects on people's interests of factors which from their perspective are a 
matter of luck.” Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, section 7 
9 Carl Knight puts it this way “variations in the levels of advantage held by different persons are justified if, and 
only if, those persons are responsible for those levels.” Knight, 2009, 1 
6 
Luck egalitarians disagree about what economic goods justice should track. Each luck 
egalitarian has their own special brand of economic good that they prioritize. For example, for 
Arneson it is “welfare,” for Cohen it is “advantage,” and for Dworkin it is “resources.”10 Instead 
of using one theorist’s preferred economic good over the other, I will use income. The specific 
economic good used should have little bearing on the effectiveness of the critique; income in this 
context is interchangeable with whatever economic good each theorist prefers. A luck egalitarian 
may substitute for income whatever brand of economic good he finds most compelling. 
Nevertheless, I use income for four reasons. First, in comparison to other kinds of economic 
goods it is easy to determine what someone’s income is. Imagine sorting through all of the 
factors that go into determining someone’s level of advantage; such a task is too complex for our 
purposes. Second, the amount of income that a person receives can easily manipulated either by 
adopting different private property rules, instituting different systems of taxation, or 
redistributing through the use of wealth transfers. Third, using income allows us to keep a foot 
firmly planted in reality since it is something that can be easily tracked, measured, and 
transferred. Fourth, using income is intelligible; that is, everyone knows what we are talking 
about.   
The notion of luck plays a central role in luck egalitarian theories.11 Luck in this context 
refers to instances where a person’s life is affected by events entirely outside of their control. For 
instance, that someone was born with only one properly functioning hand is an instance of bad 
brute luck, while someone inheriting a large sum of money is an instance of good brute luck. 
Brute luck can be contrasted with events that are caused, at least in part, by choices; e.g. deciding 
                                                 
10 See Dworkin 1981, Cohen 1989, and Arneson 1988 
11 See Mason 2006, 89, Dworkin 2000, 287, and Vallentyne 2002 
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to finish high school instead of dropping out, or choosing to work instead of taking the summer 
off. I will discuss the relationship between choice and brute luck later.  
The generic luck egalitarian standard attempts to equalize luck, but this raises the question, 
what counts as “luck”? I adopt G.A. Cohen’s account of luck which can be put in the following 
terms: “Y is a matter of luck for X if, and only if, (i) X is not responsible for Y; and (ii) X is not 
responsible for Y if, and only if, Y is not, in an appropriate way, the result of a choice made by 
X.”12 I choose this account because it seems most in line with luck egalitarian predilections, 
including those found in Dworkin and Arneson.13 Lurking behind this account and threatening to 
interrupt any meaning it might otherwise have are the topics of moral luck, responsibility, and 
free will. However, these topics fall outside the purview of what I care to consider here. For all 
intents and purposes, I assume that are people morally responsible for how they act. This is in 
accord with what luck egalitarians generally hold. Dworkin puts it this way, “We might think 
ourselves persuaded, intellectually, of the philosophical thesis that people have no free will, and 
that we are no more causally responsible for our fate when it is the consequence of our choices 
than when it flows only from a handicap or from society’s distribution of wealth. But we cannot 
lead a life out of that philosophical conviction. We cannot plan or judge our lives except by 
distinguishing what we must take responsibility for, because we chose it, and what we cannot 
take responsibility for because it was beyond our control.”14  
                                                 
12 See Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, originally from Cohen 2011 
13 I think Dworkin’s notion of responsibility is plausible here: “We take responsibility for our choices in a variety of 
ways. When these choices are freely made … we blame ourselves if we later decide that we should have chosen 
differently. We evaluate and criticize the ambitions out of which our choices are made. We try to reform or 
overcome those character traits that have led us to make choices we would prefer not to have made. Our 
circumstances are a different matter: It makes no sense to take responsibility for these unless they are the upshot of 
our choices.” Dworkin, 2000, 323 
14 Dworkin 2000, 323 
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Luck egalitarianism is a view that connects what a person is entitled to with what they 
voluntary choose. The idea is that inequalities in economic goods can only be justified if 
differences in voluntary choices alone account for these inequalities.15 Critics of luck 
egalitarianism have misconstrued the luck egalitarian position as being committed to letting 
people suffer for all of their poor choices. As Brown points out, “’luck egalitarians do not 
actually claim that every instance of voluntary choice should incur full responsibility.”16 The 
question then remains, what kind of voluntary choices can account for these inequalities? Some 
luck egalitarians hold that distributions ought to reflect ambition-sensitivity, while others are 
concerned with effort.17 Regardless of how voluntary choices that confer responsibility are 
specified, the critique offered here should apply. I use the term economic responsibility to refer 
to those voluntary choices that people are responsible for and that confer entitlement. This 
includes hard work, effort, prudence, or whatever else a luck egalitarian theorist might believe 
confers entitlement. I will assume that the only thing that is untouched by luck is economic 
responsibility. 
Now that the three notions operating in the generic luck egalitarian standard are clearly 
defined, consider the following example to make clear how the standard operates. Imagine two 
individuals, Adam and Hephaestus. Assume that they have the same job, come from similar 
backgrounds, and make the same kinds of choices. By “make the same kinds of choices,” I mean 
they have the same economic responsibility. Some might still be puzzled what I mean by this, so 
imagine that they both put in roughly the same amount of effort at their job, they are relatively 
thrifty spenders and do not squander their wealth, and they make prudent decisions such that they 
                                                 
15 Cohen says, “brute luck is an enemy of just equality, and, since effects of genuine choice contrast with brute luck, 
genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable inequalities.” Cohen 1989, 931 
16 Brown 2009, 40 
17 See Dworkin and Roemer respectively. Dworkin 1981, 311, Roemer 1996, 308 
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are careful not to cause undue harm or risk to themselves or others. So when I say that Adam and 
Hephaestus have the same economic responsibility, I mean the character of their voluntary 
choices are roughly the same. Thus, they are the same in nearly every feature except the 
following: through no fault of his own, Hephaestus is born with a physical disability which limits 
his ability to produce as much as Adam. Adam makes considerably more money than 
Hephaestus because of this fact. But given that both Adam and Hephaestus have identical 
economic responsibility and that Hephaestus is comparatively worse off due to brute luck, under 
the luck egalitarian standard, they are both entitled to an approximately equal distribution of 
economic goods.18 Therefore, in order to meet the luck egalitarian standard, there would need to 
be a transfer payment from Adam to Hephaestus to compensate for this difference.  
 
2.3 Setting the Baseline 
Since luck egalitarianism is a theory of distributive justice, it tells us what standard needs to 
be met in order to satisfy it. However, no society begins with justice, you have to arrive there 
from somewhere else. Earlier I stated the luck egalitarian should want to “preserve” income 
flowing from choice while “correcting” for income flowing from luck. The luck egalitarian 
standard seeks to do this against the backdrop of a baseline condition. That is to say, the luck 
egalitarian should want to preserve income in the baseline condition flowing from choice while 
correcting for income in the baseline condition flowing from luck.  
For this baseline condition I use an idealized market economy and do so for several reasons. 
First, a key influence on the movement, Ronald Dworkin, thinks an idealized market is 
                                                 
18 According to Lippert-Rasmussen, “Most [luck] egalitarians believe that justice requires the nullification of all 
differential effects of brute luck, feeling that it cannot be just that some people are worse off than others simply 
because they have been unfortunate, say, to have been born with bad genes.” Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, section 7 
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congruent with luck egalitarianism. Indeed, Dworkin argues that once initial equality of 
resources has been guaranteed, then a market system enables individuals to reap the rewards of 
their own choices. Dworkin says, “If he earns enough by working hard or by working at work 
that no one else wants to do, to satisfy all his expensive tastes, then his choice for his own life 
costs the rest of the community no more than if his tastes were simpler and his industry less. So 
we have no more reason to deny him hard work and high consumption than to deny him less 
work and frugality.”19 The idea is that if a person chooses to work hard to produce something, 
they should reap the rewards, and similarly if they choose leisure time instead, nobody should 
begrudge them, but they also shouldn’t expect others to sacrifice for their sake when they could 
have chosen willingly to do otherwise.  
Another reason for using an idealized market as the baseline is that it is a realistic starting 
place. By and large, market systems have prevailed over planned economies in terms of their 
overall effectiveness at providing the goods and services that people want and need. 
Furthermore, most countries today, even social democracies and communist countries, use a 
basic market framework for determining the initial production and distribution of goods, which is 
then subject to redistribution. This makes a market economy a good baseline condition, since it is 
the condition upon which any luck egalitarian redistributions would be implemented in the 
society that most people live in today.  
 Keeping with the spirit of the original motivation, I assume that in an idealized 
market economy an individual worker receives in compensation roughly his contribution. The 
idea is that the gains from production and trade reflect the ambition and industriousness of the 
laborer. Thus, as an individual increases his productivity, he also increases his income, and if he 
                                                 
19 Dworkin 2000, 85 
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decreases his productivity, he decreases his income. Of course, someone’s productivity might be 
affected due to no fault of their own. In such a case, deviations from the baseline condition may 
be required in order to satisfy the luck egalitarian standard. Indeed, the luck egalitarian standard 
is meant to handle such problems in the baseline condition.  
 To begin the analysis, consider again the two figures already introduced, Adam 
and Hephaestus. Recall that they are similar with respect to all of their features, except that 
through no fault of his own, Hephaestus has a disability which hampers his productive capacities. 
Adam on the other hand, was born healthy and has no such natural impairment. In accordance 
with our baseline condition I assumed that individuals receive roughly in proportion to their 
economic contribution. Since Adam is healthy and responsible he is able to earn 100 dollars per 
hour. On the other hand, Hephaestus is responsible but suffering from a disability and so is able 
to earn only 20 dollars per hour. I further assume that Adam and Hephaestus are members of the 
same society but have otherwise never interacted. Now I turn to investigate what the luck 
egalitarian standard demands of them.   
 
2.4 What Luck Egalitarianism Demands 
The distributions of Adam and Hephaestus according to our baseline condition can be 
represented as follows:  
Table A: Adam and Hephaestus under the Baseline Condition 
Agents Similar in Economic 
Responsibility 
Income Distribution under the 
Baseline Condition 
Adam 100 
Hephaestus 20 
 
I should note that there is one sense in which the 80 dollar difference between what the two 
receive is a matter of luck and one sense in which it is not. It is a matter of luck that Hephaestus 
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happened to have born with a lame foot, for if he had not been, then ceteris paribus, he would 
receive approximately as much as Adam. However, it would be false to say that Adam’s earning 
100 dollars per hour is a matter of brute luck. No, it was the combination of the lucky event of 
having been born healthy and his economic responsibility that resulted in Adam’s rate of 
earnings. Similarly, it was the combination of the unlucky event of having been born disabled 
and his own economic responsibility that resulted in Hephaestus earning 20 dollars per hour.  
Recall the luck egalitarian standard: Economic goods are to be allocated such that all 
individuals equally share the burden of bad brute luck, and that differences in economic goods 
are to only depend on differences in voluntary choices. Adam and Hephaestus have the same 
kind of job and exhibit economic responsibility in a similar degree and so in comparison to one 
another they do not differ with respect to their voluntary choices. The only way in which they 
differ in comparison is that Hephaestus earns less due to a natural disability, a side effect of pure 
brute luck. Therefore, since the difference between Adam’s income and Hephaestus’s income is 
attributable to bad luck, this difference is unjustified. Or as Carl Knight puts it, “variations in the 
levels of advantage held by different persons are justified if, and only if, those persons are 
responsible for those levels.”20 Since this inequality is not justified, satisfying the luck egalitarian 
standard would require transfers from Adam to Hephaestus until they are both equally well off. 
In this case, 40 dollars of income is to be redistributed from Adam to Hephaestus. I assume that 
this redistribution is performed with perfect information, perfect effectiveness, without 
transaction costs, and that transfer payments do not distort the total amount of wealth produced 
in the society.21 Table B describes the resulting distribution: 
                                                 
20 Knight 2009, 1 
21 I make these assumptions because while economic efficiency and incentive problems are important when 
considering any redistributive effort, I want to focus on the justice-bearing reasons relevant to luck egalitarianism. 
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Table B: Adam and Hephaestus under the Baseline and the LE Standard 
Agents Similar in 
Economic Responsibility 
Income Distribution 
Under the Baseline 
Condition 
Income 
Distribution Under the 
Luck Egalitarian 
Standard 
Adam 100 60 
Hephaestus 20 60 
 
2.5 The Responsibility of Others 
Having observed what conditions satisfy the luck egalitarian, I turn to demonstrate how such 
a standard effects the lives of individuals subject to standards external to their control. I add 
another character to our story to illustrate the problem. Consider someone just like Hephaestus 
with the same background, and possessing the same disability, but who does not make the same 
choices. Belphegor, despite having the choice to do so, did not apply for the same kind of job 
that both Adam and Hephaestus possess. Instead, Belphegor chooses to spend most of his time 
on enjoyable but leisurely activities. Every once in a while, Belphegor works some part time gig 
so he can eke by, but otherwise he chooses not to spend his time working. Belphegor’s disability 
does not reduce his effectiveness in these jobs. The following two counterfactual claims are true 
of Belphegor: 1) if Belphegor did not have the disability, but made the same choices, then he 
would earn the same as he does now, and 2) If Belphegor did not have the disability and he made 
the same choices that Adam did, then he would earn as much as Adam. Assume that Adam 
shares society not with Hephaestus but with Belphegor instead, what would the luck egalitarian 
standard demand? Since differences in income between Adam and Belphegor are attributable to 
choice and not to disability, then according the luck egalitarian standard of justice, it would be 
unjust to redistribute from Adam to Belphegor. Table C describes the resulting distribution:   
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Table C: Comparing Adam and Belphegor 
Agents Similar in 
Economic Responsibility 
Income Distribution 
Under the Baseline 
Condition 
Income 
Distribution Under the 
Luck Egalitarian 
Standard 
Adam 100 100 
Belphegor 10 10 
 
The distributions under the baseline condition and the luck egalitarian standard are the 
same since differences in distribution are attributable to choice and not luck. By comparing 
Hephaestus’s and Belphegor’s conditions under the luck egalitarian standard, one can appreciate 
how the luck egalitarian standard assists individuals disadvantaged due to brute luck. The move 
from the baseline to the luck egalitarian standard improves Hephaestus’s income by 300 percent, 
while the move from the baseline to the luck egalitarian standard does not improve Belphegor’s 
income since his inequality with respect to Adam is based in choice and not luck.  
 But if one looks at how Adam is affected by moving from the baseline condition 
to the luck egalitarian standard, the story looks a bit different. In Table B, the move from the 
baseline condition to the luck egalitarian condition makes Adam 40 percent worse off, while in 
Table C, the move from the baseline condition to the luck egalitarian condition does not change 
Adam’s income at all. Recall that Adam from Table B and Table C are the same in every respect 
except one lives in a society with Hephaestus while the other lives in a society with Belphegor, 
and the only difference between Hephaestus and Belphegor is their choices. In other words, 
Belphegor making different choices is the key difference between Adam’s being entitled to 100 
dollars or 60 dollars. But it is really strange for Adam’s entitlement under luck egalitarianism to 
change based on the level of responsibility of others. Table D compares their two distributions.  
Table D: Comparing Adam’s 
Agents Similar in Economic 
responsibility 
Income Distribution Under the 
Luck Egalitarian Standard 
15 
Adam (Table B) 60 
Adam (Table C) 100 
 
Recall that Adam from Table B and Table C, not only have the same economic 
responsibility they also face the same circumstances. There is literally no difference internal to 
Adam that explains their different distributions under luck egalitarianism, the difference is purely 
external, namely who they happen to share society with.  
 So why does this pose a problem for the luck egalitarian? Recall that luck 
egalitarianism was supposed to preserve income flowing from choice while correcting for 
income that was flowing from luck. In Adam’s case, under a luck egalitarian condition, his 
income depends on an external factor, namely, how responsible others are. Luck egalitarianism 
was supposed to reduce the extent to which external factors determined a person’s economic 
success, and yet Adam’s income under luck egalitarianism is indexed to an external feature, 
namely, the responsibility of others. If a moral system is meant to reduce the extent to which a 
person’s income flows from luck, it is problematic if a person’s income can be significantly 
reduced based on the choices that others make. It undermines the very goal that made luck 
egalitarianism attractive in the first place.  
 One potential response is to argue that what I am asking for is impossible. How 
could a system possibly reduce the effect of luck of some, like Hephaestus, without imposing a 
cost on others, like Adam? Indeed, the whole point of luck egalitarianism, was for individuals to 
share in the bad brute luck, not to eliminate the possibility of bad brute luck altogether, since this 
would be impossible. So, yes Adam’s life is subject to an increase in luck, and so he is a worse 
off than he otherwise would be as a result, but Hephaestus is much better off, and why should 
there be any difference between their earnings, given that they make the same kinds of choices? 
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 While this is a strong response, it is important to keep in mind the limits of such a 
response. Luck egalitarianism has two components: it is meant to correct for influences on 
income stemming from luck, and it is meant to preserve influences on income stemming from 
choice. The prior response places priority on the former while putting the latter in terms of a 
comparative. But the comparative analysis cuts both ways. It’s true that Adam and Hephaestus 
make the same choices, but it’s also true that Adam from Table B and Adam from Table C make 
the same choices, as they are in fact the same person, and only someone else in the society has 
changed. Luck egalitarianism is meant to correct for luck, but if it is to preserve for choice, then 
the relative income levels of the Adams from our two separate tables should at least be in the 
same ball park. Put differently, for people making the same choices and facing roughly similar 
circumstances there should be a significant degree of staying power in Adam’s income. That is, 
two people that make similar choices, in similar circumstances, yielding similar production 
should not have radically different earnings. A 40 percent decrease in income seems like a 
radical fluctuation and as we will observe, luck egalitarianism places no theoretical limit to such 
fluctuations.   
 
2.6 The Size of the Population 
Turning back to our original scenario, imagine that Adam lived in a society with five people 
like Hephaestus, instead of one. In Table E, I have listed the resulting distributions under the 
baseline condition and the luck egalitarian condition: 
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Table E: Adam’s Income in a Society with many Hephaestus’s 
Agents Similar 
in Economic 
Responsibility 
Income Distribution 
Under the Baseline Condition 
Income Distribution 
Under the Luck Egalitarian 
Standard 
Adam 100 33.3 
Hephaestus 1 20 33.3 
Hephaestus 2 20 33.3 
Hephaestus 3 20 33.3 
Hephaestus 4 20 33.3 
Hephaestus 5 20 33.3 
 
Recall that under the baseline condition, Adam and the Hephaestus’s directly reap the 
rewards of their own economic productivity. In the new scenario, Adam loses almost 70 percent 
of what he would possess under the baseline condition, each Hephaestus benefits by almost 60 
percent of what he possesses under the baseline. Luck egalitarianism was meant to be both luck-
reducing and choice-preserving, and while it’s luck-reducing role in the incomes of the 
Hephaestus’s can be observed, its choice-preserving role is not reflected in Adam’s income. A 
system is choice-preserving the extent to which alterations in external factors do not affect the 
income of a person facing the same conditions and making the same choices. Obviously, luck 
egalitarianism cannot be perfectly luck-reducing and choice-preserving, and it would ideally 
strike a balance between these two normative goals. However, under the luck egalitarian 
standard, there is no staying power in Adam’s income, it fluctuates completely with respect to 
the degree to which others are responsible, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the 
number of people there are.  
There is one sense in which the luck egalitarian standard is choice-preserving. Suppose 
all of the Hephaestus’s were Belphegor’s instead. In such a situation, the Belphegor’s would not 
be entitled to any transfer payments from Adam since differences in income are reflected by 
differences in choice. In other words, if we imagine all of the Hephaestus’s were Belphegor’s 
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instead, then their income under luck egalitarianism would be the same as the baseline condition 
So, under the luck egalitarian standard, the choice preserving element is just for determining 
whether or not you are eligible for transfer payments. It’s important to pause for a moment and 
consider that this is not because Belphegor’s life is deemed any less worthy. It’s simply the idea 
that in order to justify a redistribution from one person to another person, the differences in their 
income need to be rooted in luck, not choice. If Belphegor chooses to live differently than Adam 
and this is the reason why he earns less, then the disparity of incomes is not arbitrary. If, 
however, he makes the same choices and Adam and earns less based on luck, then these 
differences are arbitrary, or so the luck egalitarian reasoning goes. So, the luck egalitarian 
standard is choice preserving in the sense that it preserves the income among a group of 
individuals who have chosen to lead similar lives. That is, the luck egalitarian standard is choice 
preserving in the interpersonal comparative sense, but not in the counterfactual sense.   
To demonstrate, I consider Adam’s income across different societies, comparing his 
respective income in one society to another. The only factor that varies among each of these 
societies is the number of Hephaestus’s present. All other considerations in the society are the 
same. For ease of discussion I will be referring to four Adams (and each of whom 
lives in a different society. While each Adam is a different person, we can imagine each of them 
as virtual clones of one another having the same background, facing the same situation, and 
making the same choices. The only difference between them is the number of Hephaestus’s in 
each respective society. Table F lists the income of each Adam across various societies and 
compares each of them across the baseline condition and the luck egalitarian standard. 
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Table F: Adam’s Income Across Societies  
Adams from 
Different Societies 
# of 
Hephaestus’s in 
Society 
Adam’s 
Income Under the 
Baseline Condition 
Adam’s 
Income Under the 
Luck Egalitarian 
Standard 
Adam  0 100 100 
Adam  1 100 60 
Adam  5 100 33.3 
Adam  20 100 23.8 
 
This table illustrates that under the luck egalitarian standard across societies, individuals 
who face the same situations and make the same choices have radically different distributions. In 
particular, as the number of Hephaestus’s increase, Adam’s income approaches, though never 
reaches, 20 dollars. In other words, under luck egalitarianism, as the proportion of Hephaestus’s 
increase, Adam’s income moves closer to whatever their average under the baseline happens to 
be. However, there is absolutely no difference between the Adam in each of these societies and 
yet under the luck egalitarian standard, Adam  earns nearly 5 times what Adam earns. If there 
is no difference between each Adam across the various societies, why should the distribution of 
each radically fluctuate between them?  
What the luck egalitarian standard fails to take into account is that there are different 
kinds of brute luck. The population size, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the 
responsibility of other people in a given society are all external to Adam. Recall that “Y is a 
matter of luck for X if, and only if, (i) X is not responsible for Y; and (ii) X is not responsible for 
Y if, and only if, Y is not, in an appropriate way, the result of a choice made by X.”22 None of 
these three things (population size, the amount of bad luck that others face, and the responsibility 
of other people) are a result of a choice made by Adam, and so Adam is not responsible for them. 
                                                 
22 See Lippert-Rasmussen 2014, originally from Cohen 2011 
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Yet his earnings under the luck egalitarian standard are indexed to these three factors. But Adam 
can no more alter these things than Hephaestus can alter his disability. One of the main reasons 
to adopt luck egalitarianism was out of a concern that a person’s economic life not hinge entirely 
on external factors. But under the luck egalitarian standard, Adam’s economic life does in fact 
hinge on these external factors. Paradoxically, implementing the luck egalitarian standard 
threatens the very notion that it was meant to safeguard, namely, that the economic success of an 
individual’s life is to flow from his own choices and not be subject to factors outside of his own 
control. Thus the implementation of the luck egalitarian standard undermines the original 
motivation for adopting luck egalitarianism in the first place.   
 The problem emerges because there is not a non-comparative manner in which luck 
egalitarianism is choice-preserving; egalitarianism is necessarily comparative. It is worth noting 
that the critique put forward here is not an attack from within egalitarianism, but from the 
outside. The whole point of egalitarianism is to divide the pie equally across some 
equalisandum.23 Luck egalitarianism says that for any group of people with similar economic 
responsibility, individuals in that group ought to share in the burdens of bad luck. So, it is a 
simple consequence of egalitarianism that as you add more people without increasing the total 
social product (by much), then the total social product will have to be further divided such that 
each person’s share becomes smaller. So this cannot be a critique of luck egalitarianism as a 
form of egalitarianism, because egalitarianism involves equalizing members of a particular group 
across a given good, and the luck egalitarian standard achieves that among members of a 
particular society.   
                                                 
23 “An equalisandum claim specifies that which ought to be equalized.” Cohen 1989, 908 
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The critique shows that egalitarianism makes our lives dependent on factors beyond our 
control, in this case, the conditions of others. Egalitarians, generally speaking might not see 
anything particularly problematic with Adam’s economic success being tied to how many 
Hephaestus’s exist since this just is a necessary consequence of egalitarianism. Indeed, it is easy 
to imagine someone asserting that we have not raised a critique for egalitarianism, we have just 
demonstrated its implications. Yet such a response fails to properly address the point. 
Egalitarians in general might be willing to bite this bullet, but luck egalitarians in particular, 
sincerely motivated by the idea that we should insulate an individual’s life from brute luck, 
cannot so easily shrug off the charge. This is because the luck egalitarian standard is being 
critiqued on the very ground that motivates it, i.e. it makes Adam’s life completely subject to 
luck. The problem is that egalitarianism, as a process of distribution, is responsible for the brute 
luck affecting Adam’s life. Luck egalitarians either need to show why treating Adam in this way 
does not undermine the original motivation or deny that luck egalitarianism entails that we 
should treat Adam this way. 
Luck egalitarians wishing to defend their view have five routes available. First, they can 
argue that Adam’s economic success is not ruled by luck under the luck egalitarian standard 
because he has no presocial entitlements, that is, he has no claim that his entitlement 
approximate the baseline condition. Second, they can deny that the idealized market condition is 
a legitimate baseline and argue that some other baseline is required. Third, they could challenge 
the assumption that Adam has a unique entitlement to his income and hold that Hephaestus has 
some claim to that income since the product of their labor is inextricably joint. Fourth, they could 
contend that the kind of brute luck Adam becomes subject to under the luck egalitarian standard 
is warranted from the standpoint of justice, while the kind of brute luck that Hephaestus is 
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subject to without the standard in place is unjust and therefore worthy of rectification. Fifth, they 
could object to the interpretation of the luck egalitarian standard offered here and could argue 
that the standard does not entail aggregating the sum of labor and dividing it equally among 
those with identical economic responsibility, therefore avoiding the objection that the luck 
egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life dominated by brute luck. I will explain and then respond 
to each of the five objections in turn. 
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3 HANDLING OBJECTIONS 
3.1 Objection #1: The Baseline Does Not Matter 
The first line of defense for the luck egalitarian might be made along Rawlsian lines. Just 
distributions are arrived at under a fair scheme of cooperation.24 If the luck egalitarian scheme is 
fair, then whatever distributive outcomes that arise from it are also fair. The objection may also 
be put this way: Adam does not have any entitlement prior to the just social arrangements being 
put in place. That is, merely because the 100 dollars under the baseline condition are a product of 
his choice, that fact alone does not entitle Adam to those 100 dollars. Instead, Adam only derives 
a legitimate entitlement from whatever he would get according to a fair social schema. For luck 
egalitarians, the fair social schema is the luck egalitarian standard, so Adam is only entitled to 
outcomes derived from a correct implementation of that standard. Since Adam does not have any 
presocial entitlements, he is not being unjustly deprived of anything. Under this line of 
reasoning, none of the Adam’s, and , have any entitlements independent of the luck 
egalitarian scheme. Therefore, none of them have legitimate grounds of complaining about their 
respective distribution.    
There are two problems with the objection and I will begin with the less significant 
problem. If Robinson Crusoe built a canoe from the resources that he had on his desert island, 
independent of anyone else’s assistance, and someone came along and took the canoe, they seem 
to have wronged Robinson Crusoe.25 If there are no presocial entitlements whatsoever, why 
would it be wrong to take the canoe without Robinson Crusoe’s consent? It cannot be on the 
                                                 
24 Rawls says, “I stress that there is no criterion of a legitimate expectation, or of an entitlement, apart from the 
public rules that specify the scheme of cooperation. Legitimate expectations and entitlements are always based on 
these rules.” Rawls 2001, 72 
25 Nozick raised this issue in response to Rawls saying, “wouldn’t it be unjust if someone stole another’s products in 
the noncooperative situation?” Nozick 1974, 186 
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basis that Robinson Crusoe would otherwise use the canoe, since it would not be wrong to take 
some of the coconuts on the island despite the fact that Robinson Crusoe might use them.26 The 
obvious difference is that Robinson Crusoe built the canoe, but he did not build the coconuts. 
Robinson Crusoe had to exert his time, effort, and energy into producing something, and so his 
entitlement is a product of his choices in response to his circumstances. To deprive Crusoe of the 
canoe is to deprive him of living the life that he chooses.  
Some might object to this reasoning on grounds that luck egalitarians typically reject 
Lockean entitlement claims derived from the product of one’s labor.27 But Lockean entitlement 
theory is not necessary to reach the conclusion that Crusoe has a unique entitlement claim to the 
canoe that others do not have. Suppose, for example, in Village A that Crusoe’s canoe is 
regarded as common property, such that anyone in the village is capable of using it at any time 
and for any reason, and that Crusoe’s claim to the canoe does not trump anyone else’s claim at 
any given time. Now imagine in Village B that Crusoe’s canoe is regarded as his own property 
except in emergency circumstances such as when another villager is drowning. Now consider the 
following question, does Crusoe have more control over the way his life goes in Village A or in 
Village B?  Canoes, of course, are advantageous for fishing, catching crabs, or just enjoying the 
water, so in Village A, there will likely be constant use of Crusoe’s canoe, while in Village B, 
Crusoe’s will have access to the canoe whenever he needs it. So when answering the question, is 
there any doubt that he has greater control over the economic success of his life in Village B than 
in Village A?  
                                                 
26 With the obvious stricture that we should not take all the coconuts thus depriving Crusoe the ability to feed 
himself. See Locke 2005, 16 
27 Dworkin 1988,312 
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The luck egalitarian might respond, sure, Crusoe has more control of his life, but this 
comes at the expense of others. But this actually does not follow. Crusoe’s production of a canoe 
does not prevent others from creating their own canoes. Indeed, there are likely to be more 
canoes in Village B than in Village A since people have more of an incentive to produce canoes 
in Village B than in Village A.28 But even apart from this economic fact, Village B is more in 
keeping with each person choosing the life he wishes to lead. In Village B, someone who prefers 
to eat coconuts, and spend the rest of their time lounging on the beach, is free to do so. 
Presumably, their preference for doing this bundle of activities is greater than another bundle of 
activities, such as giving up beach time to craft a canoe. By contrast, when this same person in 
Village A has the entitlement claim to use Crusoe’s canoe whenever it becomes available, it 
comes at Crusoe’s expense. Crusoe, on the other hand, cannot make use of this person’s beach-
time. In Village B, there is a symmetry of relationship between the two persons such that each 
can gain the benefits of how to spend their time, while in Village A, there is an asymmetry such 
that Crusoe’s use of his time benefits others, while the use of others’ time does not benefit 
Crusoe. At the end of the day, Village A is not choice-preserving with respect to labor time, 
while Village B is choice-preserving with respect to labor time.  
If eroding Crusoe’s entitlement claim to the product of his creation diminishes his control 
over the economic success of his life, then the same holds true of Adam. There are circumstances 
in which the tribe is justified in using Crusoe’s canoe without his consent, like in the specified 
case of drowning villagers. The same applies in Adam’s case, such that society can be justified in 
reducing Adam’s income to assist Hephaestus. However, if there are no limits placed on the 
extent to which Hephaestus can claim a share of Adam’s earnings, then Adam living under a 
                                                 
28 For a good analysis of this, see Schmidtz 1994 
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luck egalitarian standard is like Crusoe living in Village A. The result is that the luck egalitarian 
standard completely erodes the baseline and undermines the ability for Adam to control his own 
economic life. Adam uses his time in response to his circumstances to produce 100 dollars per 
hour for himself. Recall that Adam did not inherit this money; it is a product of his choices in 
response to his circumstances. In order to be choice-preserving, luck egalitarianism must 
preserve some reasonable amount of income such that the effectiveness of his choice is not 
diminished. If, for example, Adam’s income fluctuated between 70 dollars and 130 dollars under 
the luck egalitarian standard in response to alterations in the responsibility of others and the 
population size, then an argument can be made that luck egalitarianism satisfies choice-
preservation. But I have shown that changes in these two external features cause radical 
perturbations in Adam’s income despite him making the same choices in response to the same 
circumstances.  
Some luck egalitarians might not be convinced that Crusoe has any entitlement to the 
canoe, and thus be unmotivated by appeal to the case presented here. These luck egalitarians 
might deny that the choice-preserving element ought to be derived from some relevant baseline, 
or even that it should play a role at all. For instance, one can imagine some luck egalitarian 
theorist asserting that all that matters is the comparison between two individuals. They might say 
Robinson Crusoe, Adam, Hephaestus, or anyone else can only have an entitlement claim in 
virtue of the comparative procedure determined by the luck egalitarian standard and on no other 
basis. Can these luck egalitarians escape the problem at hand? 
One need not assume that Adam has any presocial entitlements in order to see how the 
luck egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life subject to unremitting luck. Even if entitlements are 
only legitimately derived on a purely comparative basis, Adam’s income still entirely depends on 
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external features. To see this, look at each of the tables, ignore the baseline and instead only look 
at distributions under luck egalitarian standard. It still remains true that the economic success of 
his life is dependent on how many other people there are, how responsible they are, and how bad 
off they are. While the critique becomes stronger if one holds the commitment that Adam has 
some entitlement to the income generated by his choices, it does not depend on it. It’s still true 
that Adam in one society will fare significantly better than Adam in another based on entirely 
external features that he is not responsible for. Therefore, even if one takes the radical 
assumption that there are no presocial entitlements and that entitlements are only ever 
determined through the comparative procedure, the problem of indexing Adam’s life to luck 
based features remains. 
3.2 Objection #2: Idealized Markets Are the Wrong Baseline 
While Dworkin thinks that the market can serve as a legitimate baseline, other luck 
egalitarians, such as Cohen, might find this objectionable and instead argue that some other 
baseline is legitimate. They might further argue that choosing the appropriate baseline can solve 
the problem since under the correct baseline, we can parse out income accrued due to choice 
versus income accrued due to luck.   
The original situation can be altered to show that the problem remains under any baseline 
condition. Imagine that the 100 dollars Adam receives is derived from whatever the respective 
luck egalitarian might consider to be a legitimate baseline, whether it is the resources Adam 
directly gathered from nature, the full value of Adam’s labor that can be ascertained in an 
idealized socialist scheme, the transactions that Adam makes in a system of fairly agreed upon 
social rules, trades that Adam participates in within a free market, or whichever other process 
that confers legitimate holdings that the luck egalitarian would accept.  
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Once the original baseline has been established, apply the same process of reasoning as 
before. Imagine, for instance, society adopts one of G.A. Cohen’s suggestions, that every hour of 
work gets paid the same. The idea is that since work is paid the same, each person gets to choose 
the relevant work to leisure trade-off that is best for them, and so “under a system where each 
gets the same income per hour, but can choose how many hours she works, it is not an 
intelligible complaint that some people have more take home pay then others.”29 However, 
suppose that Hephaestus’s disability could limit the number of hours it is possible for him to 
work, while Adam has the ability to work as much as he chooses. Now imagine that as a result, 
the distribution is the same as in our original situation (Table B), such that Adam receives 100 
and Hephaestus receives 20 dollars. So, even in Cohen’s chosen case, deviations from the 
baseline will occur, such that Hephaestus is still disadvantaged compared to Adam. This is 
because regardless of what system is used to confer original entitlement, it is always possible, 
indeed likely, that it will stray from satisfying the comparative measure.30 Cohen would agree 
with this point, and I raised it only to demonstrate that choosing a different baseline will not fix 
the structural problem that I’ve identified, and so this objection dissipates.   
 
3.3 Objection #3: Adam Cannot Do It Alone 
A third line of response by the luck egalitarian involves challenging the original 
assumption in the provided scenario. Someone might argue that in an advanced society, social 
products are inextricably joint, and thus no individual can claim to have an exclusive entitlement 
over some portion of the given social product.31 Adam’s production is dependent upon either the 
                                                 
29 Cohen 2009, 20 
30 Nozick 1974, 161 
31 Rawls asserts that the social product is inextricably joint. Taking a different tack but arriving at similar 
conclusions, Cohen argues that because the world is jointly owned initially, one cannot appropriate natural resources 
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production of others or the consent of others. Since Adam lives, trades, and operates in the same 
society with Hephaestus, Hephaestus’s production is a necessary part of Adam’s ability to 
produce a lot. So, Adam has no permanent entitlement claim over the 100 dollars alone, but owes 
Hephaestus some of these units since Hephaestus is a necessary part of the production process.     
I first note that challenging the assumption of the thought experiment can only be taken 
so far. Then I show that even if we take this line of reasoning as far as it goes, it leads to 
undesirable consequences for the luck egalitarian. The idea that social products are inextricably 
joint is true in the sense that many people might contribute to the process of production, but this 
does not undermine the idea that some individuals are more responsible for producing a given 
product or service than others. That is, we can still identify that the primary causal force in any 
given person’s production is that person. Consider Calliope the musician who uses expensive 
electronic equipment to produce her songs. If Calliope decided to cease working altogether, she 
would stop producing songs. In other words, her immediate choice to stop, would be sufficient to 
cease her musical production. This is not true of her production in conjunction with others. If the 
company which sold her the electronic equipment ran out of business, she could go to a different 
company. If all such advanced electronics companies ran out of business, she would have to start 
producing her songs on vinyl. If all uses of electricity were impossible because of some strange 
global catastrophe, Calliope could play in front of live audiences. We can continue along this 
line of reasoning until either Calliope gives up and chooses a different profession or she 
furnishes a guitar out the resources found in her backyard. Calliope’s production is improved by 
her interaction with others, but she decides whether she produces, what she produces, and the 
extent of that production. The point here is that Calliope’s agency is the operative causal force 
                                                 
via labor alone. See Rawls 1993, 275 and Cohen 1995. Similarly, some have also argued that ownership is a social 
fact that requires the rational consent of those affected by it. See Lindsay 2015 
30 
behind her production. The luck egalitarian who argues that we do not have legitimate holdings 
because all social products are inextricably joint holds a position which is in tension with the 
following plausible claim: that being the operative causal force behind your own production 
greatly contributes to your claim of entitlement to the product of that production. Denying the 
moral importance of this fact might be easy for an egalitarian welfarist or a utilitarian, but it is 
not easy for the luck egalitarian. If the luck egalitarian wants to take seriously the notion that our 
income should be a reflection of our choices, then it is difficult to see how the luck egalitarian 
can deny a person’s entitlement to the product of those very choices.  
There is a second problem with this line of reasoning. Predicating Hephaestus’s 
entitlement on the notion that he contributes to Adam’s product puts Hephaestus’s entitlement to 
assistance in a precarious position. What if Hephaestus was not in fact at all necessary to produce 
the 100 dollars? What if Adam’s production of 100 dollars was inextricably joint with a 
collection of other individuals that did not include Hephaestus at all? In other words, imagine 
that Hephaestus’s own contribution was completely causally unrelated to Adam; perhaps he 
made paintings that Adam did not enjoy and would never purchase. By removing Hephaestus 
from society, Adam loses nothing. If Hephaestus played no role in bringing about the 100 dollars 
Adam produced, would the luck egalitarian concede and say that Adam owes Hephaestus 
absolutely nothing? If Hephaestus’s production is not necessary to bring about the 100 dollars, 
then are Adam’s duties to Hephaestus now dissolved? Surely, the luck egalitarian would not 
want to say that Hephaestus should be left without assistance because he was not a part of the 
processes by which Adam produced 100 dollars. Biting the bullet by saying that Hephaestus is 
entitled to no assistance whatsoever would be just as damaging to the luck egalitarian position as 
biting the bullet that the luck egalitarian standard makes Adam’s life subject to unremitting luck. 
31 
So if the luck egalitarian wants to maintain that Hephaestus is entitled to assistance even if he is 
not a part of the production, then what is the relevance of the social product being inextricably 
joint? Either the social products being inextricably joint is a fact relevant to the entitlement 
claims or it is not. If it is not relevant, then this objection dissolves. If it is relevant, then the luck 
egalitarian is predicating Hephaestus’s entitlement claim on whether or not he is a part of 
productive process. Then in the cases where Hephaestus (or those like him) are not a part of the 
joint productive process, they are then left out in the dust, with no entitlement claims.    
 
3.4 Objection #4: Only Interpersonal Luck Matters 
A fourth response involves distinguishing between different kinds of brute luck. Susan 
Hurley, a prominent critic of luck egalitarianism, distinguished between two kinds of luck that 
might be helpful for the luck egalitarian here. Hurley differentiates between interpersonal luck 
and counterfactual luck. Under the interpersonal account, “I compare my situation with other 
people’s situations. I have bad luck when what I and others have is a matter of luck, and I am 
worse off than others.”32 Interpersonal luck only comes into play when there are comparative 
differences between individuals that are based on luck. Alternatively, under the counterfactual 
account, “I compare my actual situation with other possible situations I might have been in. I 
have bad luck when what I have is a matter of luck and I am worse off than I might have been.”33 
Here the point of comparison is not between separate individuals, but between the situations that 
you might have otherwise been in. Distinguishing between these two kinds of luck enables us to 
see the different ways that Adam’s and Hephaestus’s life become subject to luck.  
                                                 
32 Hurley 2003, 156 
33 Hurley 2003, 156 
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In the original situation featured in Table A, the difference between Adam and 
Hephaestus’s distribution is one of interpersonal luck. Adam and Hephaestus have equivalent 
degrees of economic responsibility, but Hephaestus has 80 fewer units of income due to morally 
arbitrary factors, and hence has bad interpersonal luck. This is in contrast with the kind of 
analysis I ran when comparing Adam’s situation in Table A with his situation in Table C. In that 
case, we compared Adam’s state under the luck egalitarian standard with Adam’s potential state 
without that standard and noted that the differences in his income were not based on his 
economic responsibility, meaning that in Table C, he suffered from bad counterfactual luck. The 
defender of luck egalitarianism might contend that we should only concerned with interpersonal 
brute luck and not counterfactual luck. This would allow her to evade the critique posed here 
since the critique supposedly rests upon the notion of counterfactual luck.  
 This response suffers two drawbacks. First, the luck egalitarian needs to say why 
we are concerned with interpersonal luck and not counterfactual luck in a way that is non-
question begging. The luck egalitarian needs independent grounds for compensating one kind of 
luck without being concerned with the other. Yet it seems unlikely that there is a way of doing 
this that is not in tension with the original motivation for adopting luck egalitarianism in the first 
place. The concern about luck was motivated by the idea that our lives should be up to us. The 
point was that we should be in control of our own lives and that external events impinge on the 
possibility of individual control.34 So if part of the concern was ensuring that individuals control 
their lives, then all forms of luck pose a potential threat to that control. Why exclude some forms 
of luck from our considerations of control? 
                                                 
34 Explaining the luck egalitarian view here, Cohen says, “the grounding idea of Dworkin’s egalitarianism is that no 
one should suffer because of bad brute luck,” and then he goes onto say “I believe that we should compensate for 
disadvantage beyond a person’s control...” Cohen 1989, 922 
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 The second problem with this response is that my critique can be described both 
in terms of interpersonal and counterfactual luck. In fact, Table D is just a list of comparisons 
between different individuals, all named Adam, in different societies. I compared two different 
people, Adam  and Adam who earn radically different amounts, except the only difference 
between them is that they live in different societies. Adam has bad interpersonal luck since he 
is far worse off than Adam and this difference is not derived from differences in choice. So 
even if the luck egalitarian could give a reason for compensating interpersonal luck over 
counterfactual luck they still remain saddled with the problem presented here.  
 Some luck egalitarians may want to make the claim that we should not be 
concerned with luck between individuals living in separate societies, but only among individuals 
living within societies. They may argue that since the critique rests on a comparison between 
Adam across different societies, that it only applies to global luck egalitarianism and not intra-
societal luck egalitarianism.35 However, this ignores the changes in population size and relative 
levels of responsibility that happen within societies themselves. I could have just as easily made 
the comparison between the same Adam in the same society across different time slices. For 
instance, if over the course of decades the Belphegor’s change their habits to become more like 
Hephaestus’s, then Adam’s level of entitlement would radically transform despite Adam’s 
choices and level of production remaining the same. Thus a kind of intra-societal luck 
egalitarianism does not evade the challenge I have posed here.  
 
                                                 
35 See Blake et al 2013, section 4.1 
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3.5 Objection #5: Separate Choice-Derived Income from Luck-Derived Income 
The previous four objections are all premised on defending the luck egalitarian standard 
and the resulting distributions. However, some luck egalitarians might want to argue that the 
prior discussion was ill construed and assert that luck egalitarianism is not committed to the 
distributions detailed in the examples. Some luck egalitarians might think that we are making the 
distributive cut across the wrong lines. As Dworkin puts it, we shouldn’t seek to “squeeze the 
differences out of persons or lives.”36 So a luck egalitarian might ask, ‘Which portion of Adam’s 
product of labor comes from brute luck and which portion comes from economic responsibility?’ 
They may argue that the portion of Adam’s labor which is the result of brute luck is open to 
redistribution, but not the portion which is the result from economic responsibility, i.e. his 
choices.37 By separating the income derived from luck from the income derived from choice, we 
could find a natural limit to the amount that could be taken from Adam, therefore diffusing the 
critique offered here. For example, if it turned out that 80 units of Adam’s income came from his 
economic responsibility and 20 units from luck, then we could not take any more than 20 units 
from Adam to assist Hephaestus. If on the other hand, 50 units came from luck, and only 50 from 
economic responsibility, then we could only take up to 50 units from Adam, depending on the 
needs of Hephaestus. This solution, if applicable, would neatly solve the problem I have 
presented here.  
Before the luck egalitarian can rejoice in this solution, we need to know what it means to 
separate the income solely derived from luck and the income solely derived from economic 
responsibility. We can make some sense of the idea of income solely derived from luck. Imagine 
                                                 
36 Dworkin 2000, 334 
37 Those partial to Dworkin’s equality of resources would probably take this approach. “Some believe that justice 
requires the differential effects of option luck not to be nullified. Dworkin takes this view.” Lippert-Rasmussen 2014 
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that when you were born, you were entered into a lottery for one million dollars, and you won 
the lottery on a random drawing. There was no choice that you made to either enter the lottery or 
to improve your chances of winning, so we can describe your winning as an instance of brute 
luck. Similarly, if you inherit a large sum of money from your parents, we can say that these 
earnings are, from your perspective, luck based. You did not do much to receive the money that 
you inherited, except in so far as you made choices to remain in the good favor of your parents. 
The income earned from inheritance in this circumstance and from the perspective of the agent 
receiving the money is derived from luck. It is on this basis that the luck egalitarian should find it 
more desirable from the standpoint of justice to tax inheritance than to tax wages or salaries, 
since the latter are derived from deliberate choices of the agent earning the income and not from 
some source external to that agent. Yet while wages and salaries are derived from deliberate 
choices of the earning agent, they are not solely the consequence of his or her choices.  
Returning to the issue at hand, can the amount of income derived solely from economic 
responsibility be determined? While it’s possible to distinguish between luck and choice, the 
question is whether or not there is some portion of the income derived from choice that is free 
from the influence of luck. The problem here is that luck frames the very circumstances in which 
we make our choices to begin with.38 For example, suppose Adam decided to be a carpenter and 
he worked hard at his craft. He practiced for thousands of hours and persisted in his efforts even 
when there were moments where he wanted to give up. He sacrificed other opportunities and 
gave up considerable amounts of his free time in order to cultivate his skill. As a result of his 
efforts, he became a skilled carpenter and produced beautiful cabinets that he sold on the market. 
Adam consistently made the choices necessary for him to cultivate a profitable skillset. 
                                                 
38 Dworkin call this “The Strategic Problem.” Dworkin 2000, 323 
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However, while Adam chose to do these things with his hands, the fact that Adam had hands in 
the first place is a matter of brute luck. If Adam was not born with hands or if he was born with a 
hand deformity, he could not have cultivated his excellent carpentry skill, no matter how hard he 
tried. Similarly, the fact that Hephaestus was born with a limp foot was a matter of luck, but that 
he still made all of the efforts to live a good life was up to him. The point is that even though 
people make authentic choices, the choices that they make are dependent on the circumstances 
that they come into, and these circumstances are outside of their control.39 This is not to say that 
choice is reducible to brute luck; it just to point out that the options available to choose from are 
different because of luck. So, the results of labor are the result of both choice and luck.  
While it is possible to distinguish between luck and choice, it is impossible to parse the 
results of luck from the economic choices that we make. I am not arguing that because there is an 
element of luck in determining the choices that are available to us, that therefore we are not 
responsible for them. As Arneson rightly points out in response to Hurley, the luck egalitarian 
need not be committed to the so-called regression requirement for responsibility.40 As stated 
earlier, I am assuming that it is perfectly possible for the luck egalitarian to construe a notion of 
choice such that we can say that one is responsible for bringing about her income. Indeed, as I 
have told the story, both Adam’s and Hephaestus’s choices played an integral and primary causal 
role in the resulting income. As I have stipulated, Adam is economically responsible for 
producing his 100 units and Hephaestus is economically responsible for producing his 20 units. 
However, luck framed the very choices that they had in the first place. Therefore, it is impossible 
                                                 
39 I am not interested in objections to luck egalitarianism based on arguments against the existence of free will. I am 
trying to be as favorable as possible to the luck egalitarian position and so, as stated earlier, I am assuming that there 
is some adequate conception of authentic choice that can be worked out. Authentic choices could be construed under 
either a compatibilist or libertarian approach to freedom; this account is not metaphysically committed. 
40 See Arneson 2004, 12 
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for us to determine how much of Adam’s income was the result of luck and how much the result 
of choice, because both choice and luck were necessary and neither alone was sufficient. Since it 
is impossible to distinguish how much of one’s income is the result of luck and how much is the 
result of choice, the luck egalitarians attempt to find a natural limit based on this separation 
strategy is bound to fail.    
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 What Went Wrong? 
The upshot of this analysis is that while the luck egalitarian standard succeeds in 
mitigating the effects of bad luck that specifically flow from initial endowments, it fails to 
preserve the choice-sensitive aspects of the baseline condition, and worse than that, it indexes a 
person’s economic well-being to two external features. I explore the cause for each of these 
failures in turn. 
Luck egalitarianism’s failure to preserve the choice-sensitive aspects of the baseline 
condition stems from its insistence on a comparative standard. When comparing two individuals 
under the luck egalitarian standard, their income is aggregated and equalized whenever their 
choice sets are sufficiently similar. Such a standard fails to take into account the unique causal 
relationship a person has to their income. In other words, the luck egalitarian standard does not 
care about the causal history of someone’s production, it only cares about the relative levels 
between individuals who make similar choices. But by failing to address a person’s causal 
history, it considers a person only in light of how they compare to others and not on their own 
terms, as agents in the world who have made plans for particular reasons, have sacrificed time 
and exerted effort for particular purposes, and who monitor their labor-leisure levels in 
accordance with their own preferences. Choice-preservation from the baseline is important so 
that people not only reap the benefits of their choices but also so that they can properly execute 
their plans. By failing to preserve income flowing from choice the luck egalitarian standard runs 
roughshod over the choices that people have made and the reasons that they have made those 
choices.  
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In addition to preserving income flowing from choice, luck egalitarianism intended to 
share the burdens of bad luck and it succeeds in mitigating the effects of bad luck that flow from 
initial endowments. However, it achieves this goal by exposing individuals to two other strands 
of luck stemming from 1) the responsibility of others and 2) the population size. No given 
individual has control over how others act, and she has a negligible effect on the total population 
size. However, under a luck egalitarian standard, these two factors determine whether a person 
gets to keep the lion’s share of what they produce or if they give most of it up. The problem yet 
again lies with the comparative nature of the luck egalitarian standard. Since a person’s 
entitlements depend on comparisons between their position and responsibility relative to others, 
the lives of others will be significant factors in determining their entitlement. So while the bad 
effects of unlucky initial endowments will be reduced, this comes at cost of letting two other 
luck-based features be chief factors in determining entitlements.   
 
4.2 Reconciling Two Extremes 
The idea that choice and not luck should determine the success of a person’s life is a 
powerful idea and one that should not be abandoned despite luck egalitarianism’s failure to 
achieve it. Indeed, the notion that the success of one’s life should primarily depend on one’s own 
choices deeply resonates with common moral sentiment and is arguably the wellspring of 
liberalism. The challenge then is this: How should society balance two competing moral 
considerations, that individuals are the responsible authors of their own lives entitled to income 
flowing from their own choices, and that individuals whose lives are negatively affected by bad 
luck are entitled to robust social support? 
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With the luck egalitarian position evacuated, there is no prominent theory of distributive 
justice which properly accommodates both of these considerations. This is because the tension 
inherent in the luck egalitarian position reflects the larger tension within liberalism. Luck 
egalitarianism rests on the fault line which divides liberalism into its egalitarian and libertarian 
tendencies. The libertarian position could safeguard us from the critique at hand, since under it, 
Adam’s life is not subject to any redistributive processes, but it does this at the expense of 
making the life of Hephaestus unduly subject to luck. By letting people’s lives succumb to 
extraneous circumstances beyond their control, the libertarian position fails to embody the ideal 
that the success of a person’s life should flow from the choices she makes. Alternatively, the luck 
egalitarian position improves the position of Hephaestus whose life would otherwise be ruined 
by bad initial endowments, but it does so at the expense of making the success of Adam’s life 
wholly dependent on the choices and circumstances of others. The problem with distributive 
egalitarianism is that it considers a person’s life only in a comparative way, by assessing it in 
light of others’ lives. A system which completely ties an individual’s welfare to the welfare of 
others threatens the notion that the success of our lives is up to us, since it makes the success of 
one person’s life depend on the lives of others. For those unsatisfied by either political extremity, 
a theory of justice which can reconcile these two competing considerations is needed.  
On the one hand, a theory of justice should consider a person’s life on its own, with 
independent moral standing, irrespective of how others are doing. On the other hand, a theory of 
justice would prevent individuals from becoming victims of their circumstance.41 A system of 
                                                 
41 Ideally, we morally want to prevent anyone from falling, period, regardless of whose fault it is. But that is an 
attitude that we should have towards others and what we should consider freely doing for them. What we are 
considering here is a political regime where we coercively demand income from some and give it to others on the 
basis of justice. It is one thing to cultivate empathetic attitudes towards others on a human basis, it is another thing to 
coercively demand that all members of a political community satisfy that empathetic attitude. Distributive justice, as 
a political aim, involves considering what we can ask from others from the standpoint of justice, not from the 
standpoint of considerations of human compassion. The assumption here is that it can be legitimate to redistribute 
41 
distributive justice should mitigate the effects of bad luck but in such a way that limits the 
burdens that can be placed upon others. The problem with luck egalitarianism was not in its 
original vision, but in the machinery it used to achieve that vision. Both of its failures stemmed 
from using a comparative standard to determine entitlements. Instead of using a comparative 
standard, those motivated by luck egalitarian ideals could appeal to different kinds of normative 
machinery. For example, we could hold that individuals have a pro-tanto entitlement claim to the 
product of their labor while simultaneously holding that individuals also have a pro-tanto 
compensatory claim when bad luck strikes. The pro-tanto entitlement claim could operate by 
setting a threshold or limit on how much can be taken of each dollar earned. Also, going past 
certain thresholds would require ever increasing levels of justification, possibly up to the point of 
some absolute limit. In the other direction, a pro-tanto compensatory claim could work to 
compensate luck not on some comparative basis, but on the existence of some objective 
threshold. This could include the use of sufficientarian standards, or some other baseline against 
which bad luck is assessed against in order to determine compensatory claims. Much conceptual 
work would need to be done in order to determine how exactly this would go, but these 
suggestions indicate the possibility of legitimate alternatives for handling both kinds of 
normative claims without resorting to comparative measures.  
 In closing, the problem with the luck egalitarian approach is that luck and its effects 
cannot be conceived as a fixed amount which we then go about reapportioning. The very attempt 
to correctly reapportion luck paradoxically introduces another kind of luck into the system. 
However, this does not necessarily make futile any effort to reduce luck. Redistributing based on 
luck is like standing on a balance board; shift your weight too far in any given direction and you 
                                                 
wealth when the person receiving the redistribution is not at fault and that the legitimacy of redistribution comes into 
question when the person is at fault for their predicament. 
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fall off, that is, you make some person’s life completely subject to luck. The effort to realize a 
system that enables people to flourish based on their own choices should not involve comparing 
one life with another, but should instead seek to balance property-based entitlement claims with 
luck-based compensatory claims. In short, it is not a question of how to equalize, it is a question 
of how to balance. 
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